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Abstract 
This paper verified whether coverage limit-exceeding depositors withdraw or decrease their deposits based on the 
risk-seeking behavior of mutual savings banks even if the number of depositors are small and whether mutual savings 
banks in management crises present a relatively high-risk premium to attract deposits in order to verify the existence of 
depositor discipline for mutual savings banks. This is contrary to the perception that depositor discipline will not function 
as most of the deposits in mutual savings banks are included as targets for protection by the deposit insurance system. Next, 
the results of a verification of regional characteristics showed that there were no regional differences in depositor discipline. 
This seems to be because the information and communication technology in Korea is so developed that there is no 
information gap between urban and rural areas. Lastly, we divided the analysis period for mutual savings banks into the 
periods 2007 to 2010 before insolvencies were visible, 2011 to 2014 when restructuring was taking place, and 2015 to 
2016 after the completion of the restructuring. The results were that asset soundness had a tendency to be given more 
importance when restructuring was ongoing, and after restructuring was complete. Despite these analysis results, this paper 
still has some issues to face, which we would like to identify in the following. First, to allow depositor discipline to 
function, information about mutual savings banks must be disclosed more transparently to ordinary depositors. Next if the 
monitoring by the supervisory organizations is lacking and if not even the depositor discipline is functioning properly, it is 
necessary to reevaluate the current deposit insurance system as a whole, to lower coverage limits to make depositor 
discipline function properly. 
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1. Introduction 
As a result of numerous rounds of restructuring, the number of mutual savings banks in Korea, one of the 
representative financial institutions for the working classes, has greatly decreased in Korea from 231 in 1997 to 
80 as of June 2017. However, despite efforts at restructuring, the management conditions in mutual savings 
banks remain in a vulnerable state, and it is difficult to predict when the effects of another round of restructuring 
will occur. Generally, mutual savings banks have a simple business model of attracting depositors by providing a 
relatively higher deposit interest rate than banks, lending to high-risk borrowers at a high loan interest rate and 
earning profits through the interest margin between the two. However, due to the deterioration of the economic 
environment after 2009, many large savings banks went bankrupt or were merged as the soundness of loan assets 
rapidly deteriorated. Some scholars argue that this result for mutual savings banks is due to the delay in 
regulation by supervisory authorities and the dysfunction of the deposit insurance system. That is, the 
supervisory authorities did not properly monitor the risk taking of the mutual savings banks, and there is no 
incentive to monitor the mutual savings banks as most of the depositors had deposit amounts below the deposit 
insurance coverage amount. From this context, this dissertation’s purpose is to verify the existence of market 
discipline, especially focusing on depositor discipline regarding mutual savings banks. That is, the purpose is to 
examine whether a few large depositors make market discipline work even in a situation where most depositors 
have covered deposits below 50 million won. For this purpose, we use financial data from mutual savings banks 
and macroeconomic indicators, to examine the response of depositors following various indices of mutual 
savings banks using changes in uninsured deposits exceeding the coverage limit of 50 million won, net excess 
deposits (note 1), and deposit interest rates.   
First, in Section 2, we will examine the current status and characteristics of mutual savings banks. In Section 3, we 
will summarize the concepts of market discipline and depositor discipline as well as related literature in Korean and 
overseas research, and in Section 4, we will describe basic data and the analysis model. Next, in Section 5, we will 
summarize the results of the empirical analysis, and finally, in Section 6, we will conclude by describing future 
improvement directions. 
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2. The Current Status and Characteristics of Mutual Savings Banks 
2.1 The Current Status of Mutual Savings Banks 
 
After 2010, as the insolvency of project finance (PF) loans came into full force, the number of savings banks greatly 
decreased as restructuring was conducted to solve this issue. <Table 1> shows the status of savings banks restructuring. 
Savings banks numbered 110 in late 2007 but, after going through the crisis caused by non-performing loans, were reduced 
to 79 as of December 2016. If we examine this by year, the restructuring of savings banks rapidly increased after 2011 with 
12 banks in 2011 and 11 banks in 2012 closing, and in 2013 and 2014 when ongoing restructuring was implemented, five 
banks and four banks were closed, respectively.  
 
Table 1. Status of Savings Banks Restructuring by Year (As of November, '14, Unit: Banks) 
Category '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 
Number of Banks at start of 
period 
110 108 106 105 105 98 93 89 80 79 
Redu
ction 
Purchase and 
Assumption(P&A) 
4 2 2 1 12 11 5 4 - - 
M&A(Mergers) - - - - - - 1 8 1 - 
Insolvency - - - - - - - - - - 
Incre
ase 
Establishment 2 - 1 1 5 6 2 3 - - 
Number of Banks at end of 
period 
108 106 105 105 98 93 89 80 79 79 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Financial Statistics Information System 
 
As such restructuring was conducted, the asset size of mutual savings banks was reduced by a large amount after 
reaching its peak in June 2010. This is because many savings banks that were restructured were large savings banks, and 
existing savings banks were not able to find suitable places to invest their assets, leading to difficulties in securing sources 
of profit, which then caused the asset size of savings banks to greatly decrease. As a result, they were faced with a situation 
in which the existence of the savings banking industry itself was at risk.    
<Table 2> shows the balance of loans and deposits, as well as asset change of savings banks. The net credit of 
savings banks decreased by about 37% from 43.6 trillion won in June 2007 to 27.3 trillion won in June 2014 when 
restructuring was being conducted, before recovering to 39.5 trillion won in June 2016 when restructuring was concluded. 
Meanwhile, as the need for capital raising decreased following the reduction in loan amounts, the deposits of savings banks 
started decreasing after recording a peak of 76.4 trillion won in 2010 to 30.7 trillion won in June 2014, before remaining at 
39.2 trillion as of June 2016 following some increases.  
 
Table 2. Balance of loans and deposits, and asset change in savings banks (Unit: Trillion won, %) 
 
End of 
Jun. ’07 
End of 
Jun. ’08 
End of 
Jun. ’09 
End of 
Jun. ’10 
End of 
Jun. ’11 
End of 
Jun. ’12 
End of 
Jun. ’013 
End of 
Jun. ’14 
End of 
Jun. ’15 
End of 
Jun. ’16 
Net credit  43.5 50.7 57.0 62.4 58.3 40.5 29.1 27.6 32.2 39.5 
Corporate loans 35.7 43.2 49.2 53.5 48.1 29.3 19.4 17.8 19.1 22.5 
Household loans 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.4 9.3 10.6 9.3 9.2 12.5 16.5 
Deposits 46.5 56.0 65.9 76.4 71.1 51.5 36.9 30.7 34.3 39.2 
Loan-deposit 
ratio  
93.5  90.5  86.5  81.7  82.0  78.6  78.9  89.9  93.9  100.8  
Delinquency rate 13.7 14.0 15.8 12.8 15.8 21.6 21.5 17.9 11.6 7.6 
Assets  53.1 63.5 74.8 86.3 69.8 50.6 42.8 36.8 40.2 47.5 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Financial Statistics Information System 
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As restructuring of saving banks were conducted, the delinquency rate is in a declining trend since its peak in the 
2013 accounting period. According to <Table 2>, the delinquency rate of total loans in saving banks fell from the record 
21.6% in June 2012 to 7.6% in June 2016. As delinquency rate and non-performing loans increased, excluding the first 
quarter of 2011, the net incomes of savings banks have continuously shown losses since the June 2009 accounting period, 
and as net incomes were negative, the return on assets (ROA) also was negative from 2009 until 2015 when restructuring 
was completed, then net income returned into the black (refer to <Table 3>). 
 
Table 3. The Profitability and Soundness Trends of Savings Banks 
Category 
End of 
Jun. ’08 
End of 
Jun. ’09 
End of 
Jun. ’10 
End of 
Jun. ’11 
End of 
Jun. ’12 
End of 
Jun. ’013 
End of 
Jun. ’14 
End of 
Jun. ’15 
End of 
Jun. ’16 
Net Income  
(100 million won) 
336.7 △56.6 △766.8 △6,049.1 △2,809.3 △1,125.2 △508.0 460.7 479.9 
ROA(%) 0.58 △0.08 △1.39 △7.13 △4.40 △2.47 △1.31 1.23 2.07 
BIS Ratio (%) 9.08 9.43 9.05 0.84 4.07 9.88 14.28 14.24 14.53 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Financial Statistics Information System 
 
2.2 Mutual Savings Banks and Depositor Discipline 
 
As explained above, regarding the situation in which the soundness of mutual savings banks is deteriorating due to 
pursuing high risk following the payment of high interest rates, the need is being raised for the re-establishment of 
discipline for mutual savings banks as a means to improve this situation. Below, we examine the problems regarding the 
regulatory discipline and depositor discipline of mutual savings banks.  
After 2011, when the management situation of mutual savings banks worsened, the ratio of deposits below the 
coverage limit of 50 million won steadily increased to the point when the ratio of deposits below 50 million won rose to 
94.94% in December 2012. Generally, if we assume the depositors behave rationally, depositors under the deposit 
insurance system will minimize the possibility of deposit loss by decreasing their deposit to within the coverage limit. 
From this motivation, we can see that the management crisis of savings banks somewhat activated the discipline of 
withdrawing deposits from savings banks by large depositors, even when considering the fact that the ratio of deposits 
below 50 million won in mutual savings banks is relatively higher than banks that have many corporate clients. In the case 
of large deposits that have a relatively larger opportunity cost of deposit loss in the case that the mutual savings bank 
becomes insolvent, they will try to withdraw their deposits before the mutual savings banks become insolvent. Therefore, 
these depositors and creditor with over 50 million won will act as the agents of market discipline.  
 
Table 4. Covered Deposit Trends in Banks and Mutual Saving Banks (Units: trillion won, %)                                                                     
 2007.12 2008.12 2009.12 2010.12 2011.12 2012.12 2013.12 2014.12 2015.12 2016.12 
Insured 
Deposits 
493,667  597,938  729,286  766,017  514,992  426,203  326,708  321,772  368,180  444,098  
Deposits 
exceeding 
50 million 
won  
71,758  61,108  76,175  69,123  31,710  21,568  18,049  20,141  24,082  44,903  
Deposits 
less than 
50 million 
won 
432,437  536,830  653,111  696,894  483,281  404,635  308,660  301,631  344,099  399,195  
Ratio of 
deposits 
below 50 
million 
won 
87.60  89.78  89.55  90.98  93.84  94.94  94.48  93.74  93.46  89.89  
Source: Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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3. The Concepts of Depositor Discipline 
3.1 Market Discipline and Depositor Discipline 
 
According to Berger (1991), market discipline can be interpreted as the stakeholders of financial institutions that 
need to bear additional costs following risk-seeking acting with appropriate behavior matching their increased costs. The 
financial industry generally is an industry that requires oversight by an outside party of the stability of the financial system. 
The oversight by outside parties—that is, discipline—can largely be divided into the following three types.  
The first is regulatory discipline through direct regulation and oversight by the supervisory authorities. In the case of 
financial institutions compared with other industries, the asymmetry of information is severe so that there is a limit in the 
monitoring of moral hazard of financial institutions that can be done by outside parties such as creditors. Therefore, in most 
countries, in place of these outside parties, the government monitors and regulates the actions of financial institutions to try 
to approach the goal of stability in the financial system. Soundness regulations, including capital adequacy ratio regulations 
and business regulations, can be seen as representative examples of this. However, according to Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1994), in the case that the supervisory authorities set their goal as the maximization of export social welfare  
(note 2) or when regulatory forbearance occurs due to issues related to responsibility following monitoring failures 
or the pursuit of personal gain, there need to be regulations to compensate for this. That is, in the case when the supervisory 
authorities are responsible for prior monitoring and ex-post inspection, even if they discover ex-post corruption by financial 
institutions, this will lead to their acknowledgement that their own prior monitoring was lacking, so that the supervisory 
authority which places importance on their own reputation will try to hide this fact. A representative case of this is the 
monitoring failure of the US Savings and Loans (S&L) in the 1980s. Next is making discipline work by establishing 
internal control structures for the managers of financial institutions. Discipline through these internal controls can be 
divided into direct control over the manager through institutional organizations, such as the outside director system, and 
motivation through monetary incentives to the manager, such as stock options. However, the monitoring of the manager 
through the outside director system relies greatly on the information gathering ability of outside directors, but in reality, it is 
difficult for outside directors to gain accurate inside information, and there are many cases in Korea where non-experts are 
appointed as outside directors so that the system is not able to function effectively. Meanwhile incentive structures, such as 
stock options and performance-linked bonus systems, are a way to suppress the incentives for managers to profit from risk 
taking by establishing a compensation structure for the manager. However, the excessive amount of stock options provided 
can have the flaw of encouraging the pursuit of high risk, high reward by the manager, thus, the recent trend has been that 
the number of companies adopting this system is gradually declining. Last of all is to control the behavior of managers by 
activating market discipline of stakeholders in the private sector. In the case where stakeholders such as shareholders and 
creditors (including depositors) have a possibility of losses from the excessive risk-seeking of financial institutions, they 
withdraw their deposits or act to sell their stock and debts to avoid these losses, or demand compensation corresponding to 
this risk. Therefore, this behavior by stakeholders has the effect of suppressing excessive risk-seeking by financial 
institutions. That is, market discipline is the effect of the actions of stakeholders based on personal interests suppressing 
excessive risk-seeking behavior by financial institutions. However, what is important here is the behavior of the 
shareholders. Under the limited liability system, when shareholders judge that the possibility of recovery is low due to 
financial difficulty, they exhibit behavior matching the interest of managers by taking risk-seeking actions like owning put 
options. However, in the case of creditors, even if profitability increases for the financial institution as a result of risk-
loving behavior while they cannot partake in the excess profits due to their contracts, which allow them only to receive 
agreed upon profits, in the case that the financial institution becomes insolvent, they face the risk of taking that loss (note 3). 
Therefore for market discipline to properly work, discipline by creditors is important. However, generally in the case that 
the deposit insurance system is introduced for the purpose of financial system stability, and partial protection system is 
implemented for the protection of small sum depositors, the main agents executing market discipline are limited to large 
sum depositors and creditors. This is because the existence of the deposit insurance system generally guarantees the 
payment of deposits for small sum depositors, which eliminates the incentive to monitor the management status of 
financial institutions. Instead, the deposit insurance organization guarantees the payment of deposits within the coverage 
limit and monitors the risk-seeking behavior of the financial institution as the proxy for the depositors. However, in the 
case when the deposit coverage limit is set too high decreasing the ratio of large sum depositors, or in the case that the 
deposit insurance corporation is not able to impose an appropriate risk premium based on the riskiness of the financial 
institution, the institutional mechanisms that can regulate the moral hazard of depositors in financial institutions decreases. 
Kane (1989) finds important causes of the S&L crisis in regulatory forbearance, such as the fixed insurance system and 
delays in declaring bankruptcy, and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), during their analysis of the relationship 
between financial system stability and deposit insurance systems in 61 countries around the world from 1980 to 1997, 
argued that the stability of financial systems were harmed in countries that had an explicit deposit insurance system. 
However, the fact that deposit insurance systems contribute to the stability of financial systems by preventing bank runs 
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and increase the utility of society as a whole through their prior monitoring function and ex-post resolution function cannot 
be denied. (Mussa (1986)) Therefore, to keep these positive functions of the deposit insurance system while suppressing 
the moral hazard of financial institutions, regulatory discipline and market discipline must function properly and the 
deposit insurance system must also be designed to allow these market disciplines to function. This is because market 
discipline can be efficient as it has lower social costs compared to ordinary regulatory discipline. According to Peria and 
Schmukler(2001), market discipline has the following advantages. First, the existence of market discipline can decrease the 
causes of moral hazard in financial institutions that follow the guarantee by the government after the introduction of the 
deposit insurance system. Second, market discipline forces relatively inefficient financial institutions to be operated more 
efficiently, or in the case this does not occur, acts as pressure to force the institution out of the market, leading to the 
preemptive prevention of inefficient operations. Third, in the case that monitoring of the financial institution occurs 
efficiently through the market, the social cost following the supervision of the financial institution can be decreased. 
 
3.2 Empirical Research on Depositor Discipline 
 
Currently, most countries have selected the partial protection system with the purpose of preemptively preventing 
such depositor moral hazard(note 4). Therefore, depositors who own deposits exceeding the coverage limit have an 
incentive to monitor financial institutions as there is a good possibility that they will take losses to the deposit amounts that 
exceed the coverage limits in the case that the financial institution faces a management crisis due to excessive risk seeking 
(note 5). However, insured depositors are not always indifferent to the management status of financial institutions. Kane 
(1987) presents research results stating that generally insured depositors also rely somewhat on the management status of 
financial institutions when deciding whether to deposit or not, although not in the same way as uninsured depositors. In 
addition, according to Park and Peristiani (1998), it was shown that insured depositors also consider the riskiness of 
financial institutions. Therefore, insured depositors can also play a role in certain circumstances to allow market discipline 
to function. 
Research on depositor discipline can largely be divided into research that verifies that existence of depositor 
discipline through comparative analysis of many countries, and research that verifies this existence through the behavior of 
depositors in a single country. A representative example of the former is Demirguc-Kunt and Levin (2004), who argued 
that the higher the coverage limit and the wider the coverage scope of deposit insurance in a country, the weaker the 
financial system was. In addition, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) utilized data by country to report that countries 
that operate deposit insurance systems or have higher coverage limits are more likely to face financial crises. Meanwhile 
Hosono et al. (2004) utilized the data from 60 countries to show that the depositors of countries with strong government 
regulation and oversight had a low response to deposit interest rate as an indicator of risk. In addition, Peria and Schmukler 
(2001) showed the depositor discipline was functioning through analysis of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Research on 
depositor discipline by country was mostly centered around the United States and was mainly focused on jumbo CDs or 
subordinated debt that were not protected by the deposit insurance system. Ellis and Flanney (1992) analyzed the 
correlation between the interest rates of CDs issued between 1982 and 1998 with the riskiness of banks and concluded that 
depositor discipline did not appear even in the case of large banks. In addition, the results of analysis by Park (1995) on 
interest rates, and the likelihood of insolvency and asset size of financial institutions, focusing on uninsured deposits 
showed that some depositor discipline existed but that there was no risk premium following asset size. In addition, Billet et 
al. (1998) proved the fact that a credit rating downgrade by Moody’s increases the dependence by the bank on covered 
deposits. Meanwhile, research using analysis of financial institutions other than banks include Goldberg and Hudgins 
(1996, 2002), and Park and Peristiani (1998). Goldberg and Hudgins (1996) using savings association data from 1986 to 
1989 proved that the more the financial institution came closer to impending bankruptcy, the more the ratio of uninsured 
deposits by depositors decreased. In the research of Goldberg and Hudgins (2002) with a different analysis period, they 
showed that the covered deposits increased in savings associations facing insolvency and that savings associations that 
were facing bankruptcy were more passive at attracting covered deposits than saving associations that had already gone 
bankrupt. In addition, Park and Peristiani (1998) also showed that the risk of savings associations and increases in 
uninsured deposits had a negative (-) relationship, while it has a positive (+) relationship with interest rates. 
Meanwhile, in Korea, research that analyzes market discipline and depositor discipline using the financial 
statements of financial institutions is extremely limited. This is because disclosure of business information of financial 
institutions before the foreign exchange crisis was very limited, and this information did not go through a verification 
process making its reliability low. Therefore, research on market discipline in Korea mainly occurred after 2000, and 
representative research includes Chun and Oh (2001), Chun (2002), and Park (2002). Chun and Oh (2001) investigated 
whether the market discipline of depositors and creditors functioned targeting commercial banks, they analyzed the 
relationship between savings deposits and capital adequacy ratio, and whether additional interest rates were demanded 
dividing the time periods of before 1997, when the full amount guarantee system was implemented, the foreign exchange 
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crisis period, and after 2001 when the partial guarantee system we implemented, and they found that before the foreign 
exchange crisis while some depositor discipline existed, during the foreign exchange crisis period when the full amount 
guarantee system was implemented, depositor discipline did not function, and that later as we shifted to the partial 
guarantee system the depositor discipline is somewhat functioning. In addition, Park (2002) utilized half yearly data from 
1990 to 2001 to examine whether depositor discipline was functioning using deposit change amounts and deposit interest 
rates to reach a similar result to Chun (2002). 
Meanwhile for research on depositor discipline targeting saving banks there are the examples of Park (2009), Choi 
(2012), and Kim (2017). Park (2009) utilized data from 2003 to 2007, and Choi (2012) utilized data from 2001 to 2010 to 
analyze depositor discipline in savings banks. The results showed that for savings banks, depositor discipline was 
somewhat functioning. Kim (2017) utilized quarterly data from 2006 to 2016 to analyze market discipline of savings banks 
and using the results it was argued that market discipline functions for savings banks. However, Kim (2017) divided the 
2011-2014 period when bankruptcy of savings banks was ongoing into 2011-2012 and 2013-2016 in order to broadly 
interpret the restructuring period of savings banks. Therefore it can be said that this research is different in that unlike the 
research described above it uses analysis that divides the periods into the period before insolvency, during insolvency, and 
after insolvency; as well as various dependent variables to analyze whether market discipline is functioning. In the next 
section, we will explain the model and related data to verify whether depositor discipline exists for mutual savings banks. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
Generally, in the case when depositor discipline is properly functioning, when the riskiness of financial institutions 
increases, the depositors reduce their deposits or demand additional premium for the additional risk, and as a result, the 
funding costs of financial institutions generally increase. Existing research verifies this generally by using the two methods 
of verifying whether depositor discipline exists based on the increase and decrease of deposits exceeding the coverage limit 
and changes in interest rates or based on simultaneous analysis of both sides. That is, deposits that exceed the coverage 
limit that are excluded as targets of protection have a stronger tendency for risk aversion compared to ordinary depositors. 
Therefore, it verifies whether depositor discipline is functioning through the behavior of uninsured depositors for jumbo 
CDs or large time deposits. In existing research targeting Korean banks, depositor discipline is analyzed through ordinary 
deposits or uninsured deposits and not deposits exceeding the coverage limit. However, deposits exceeding the coverage 
limit and uninsured deposits differ when looking at their precise meaning, and in order to more clearly judge whether 
depositor discipline is functioning, it is more appropriate to analyze the deposits exceeding the coverage limit, which is 
paid when actual financial institutions are closed. For these reasons, in this paper, analysis was conducted dividing the 
deposits exceeding the coverage limit of million won, and the net excess deposit which only includes the amount that 
exceeds the coverage limit from deposits exceeding the limit.  
The dependent variables related to the above deposits are calculated using the increase in deposits. The increase rate 
in deposits used the log difference increase rate compared to the previous year. Meanwhile, deposit interest rates utilized 
the deposit interest rate for each savings bank announced by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation. Generally, deposit 
interest rates use the average balance of deposits for each quarter divided by the amount of interest paid. However, in this 
case it is difficult to verify whether a premium equivalent to the risk that uninsured depositors bear is paid, so in this 
research the deposit interest rates collected by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation are used. Next, for independent 
variables that represent the risk seeking of savings banks the BIS capital adequacy ratio (note 6), collateral loan ratio, 
liquidity ratio, NPL ratio, and costs-assets ratio were selected. The BIS capital adequacy ratio is a representative indicator 
that shows capital adequacy, and in the case the BIS capital adequacy ratio is high the ratio of uninsured deposits is 
expected to increase. This is because even in the case when the mutual savings bank becomes insolvent, if it has enough 
equity to cancel this out, losses may not occur for the depositors. For the same reason, the variables of collateral loan ratio 
and liquidity ratio were selected as variables that decrease the risk for depositors. In addition, the NPL ratio is used as an 
indicator of asset soundness, and in the case that depositor discipline is functioning, when the NPL ratio increases deposit 
amounts are expected to decrease. Last of all, the reason that the costs-assets ratio was selected was because in the case of 
mutual savings banks it is presumed that generally it will have relationship banking type loans and deposits due to its 
characteristics as a regional financial institution, so that when employees actively participate in actions to attract deposits, it 
is expected that costs will increase as well as deposit amounts. In addition to this, we selected the value of log applied to 
total assets as a variable in order to exclude the effects based on the size of the mutual savings bank. Inflation rate, savings 
rate, and composite price index of stocks fluctuations were used as variables that not only represent the riskiness of mutual 
savings banks but also as macroeconomic variables that have the same effect on all mutual savings banks. The reason that 
macroeconomic indicators were used as independent variables was because of the consideration given to the characteristics 
of mutual savings banks which react sensitively to business fluctuations. The inflation rate was included to examine the 
change in coverage limit following inflation, the composite price index of stocks fluctuations represents the preference 
toward alternative assets, and the savings rate was used to examine the propensity to save by depositors. The analysis 
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period used the half yearly information from June 2007 to December 2016 from usable financial information on mutual 
savings banks. In order to more clearly analyze depositor discipline targeting Korean mutual savings banks, analysis was 
divided into three periods: before restructuring of savings banks (2007–2010), restructuring period (2011–2014), and after 
restructuring of savings banks was completed (2015–2016). The number of mutual savings banks targeted for analysis was 
121 including mutual savings banks whose operations were halted during the target period, and these were verified using 
the unbalanced Panel. In order to select a suitable model for panel analysis combining cross-section and time series a few 
verification tasks are required. Generally the estimation model selection in a panel analysis changes based on whether a 
fixed value is used for the constant term or a random value is used. Therefore, for the constant term of the estimation 
equation, whether there is equality must be verified using F-statistic, and if the null hypothesis that the constant term is 
equal is not rejected than ordinary least squares (OLS) is selected, in the case it is rejected than the fixed effect model, and 
in the case it is not rejected than the random effect model is used. The random effect model here unlike the fixed effect 
model has the advantage that it can be used even in the case a time invariant explanatory variable exists and it can improve 
the efficiency of the estimated values. Therefore as this paper has a time invariant explanatory variable, we used the 
random effect model.  
The empirical model we use to estimate the relationship between risk taking and excess deposit is represented 
in equation (1). We also investigate whether net excess deposit enhances risk-taking, as modeled in equation (2). 
Lastly, we analysis using deposit interest rate to risk premium about risk raking behavior in equation (3). All the 
explanatory variables are lagged by one period from the dependent variable to clarify the causality with risk or 
firm performance. We employ panel regression methodology in order to estimate equations. 
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                                     (1) 
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where i and t represent particular savings banks and time.  
 
Here, the   variables are the factors that are affected risk taking behavior of the individual savings 
bank. We use BIS ratio, collateral loan ratio, non-performing loan ratio, liquidity ratio, costs-assets ratio, deposit 
interest rate as the risk-taking factors. And 
  is a macro variable that affects the overall management of the 
savings banks. We use stock market index fluctuation, savings rate, inflation rate as the macro economic variable 
that is affected the depositor’s behavior. 
 
Table 5. Explanation of Variables 
      Dependent Variables                             Content 
UNI 
 
DEP 
 
RATE 
The sum of deposits exceeding 50 million won and the deposits of financial 
institutions (excess deposits) 
The sum of deposits amounts in excess of the 50 million won coverage limit from 
deposits that exceed 50 million won (net excess deposits) 
Deposit interest rate 
Independent Variables  
BIS 
COL 
NPL 
LIQ 
 
COA 
RATE 
BIS Capital adequacy ratio (half yearly) 
Collateral loan ratio (collateral loans/total loans) 
Non-performing loan ratio (non-performing loans/total loans) 
Liquidity ratio (current assets with less than three months maturity/current liabilities) 
Costs-assets ratio (selling, general and administrative expense/total assets) 
Deposit interest rate 
KOSPI 
SAVING 
INF 
Regional dummy 
Stock market index fluctuation 
Savings rate (unconsumed portion of disposable income/disposable income) 
Inflation rate 
1 in the case of savings banks in the capital region, 0 for other regions 
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5. Analysis Results 
In this analysis, a half year of data from mutual savings banks from 2007 to 2016 were utilized. <Table 6> is the 
descriptive analysis of the variables used in the panel analysis model, and <Table 7> represents the correlation coefficient 
between the variables. We can see that uninsured deposits have a negative (-) relationship with collateral loan ratio and 
stock market index fluctuation, and net uninsured deposits have a similar correlation with uninsured deposits. The negative 
correlation between deposit interest rate and the deposit variables that represent market discipline can be interpreted to be 
due to increases in deposit interest rates to be considered by the market to be a sign that the soundness of the savings bank 
has worsened due to cases such as when soundness is greatly weakened following investment in risky assets such as PF 
loans caused by savings banks raising capital at high interest rates, and therefore the market decreases deposits that exceed 
the insured deposit amounts. Generally, if we examine the uninsured depositors which are expected to have depositor 
discipline function, increase in uninsured deposits was shown to be statistically significant to the variables of collateral loan 
ratio and NPL ratio which represent asset soundness. However, unlike general expectations, the collateral loan ratio had a 
negative correlation, and the NPL ratio was shown to have a positive correlation.  
 
Table 6. Descriptive Analysis 
Variable 
Observation 
coefficient   
 Mean Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Excess deposits 1764 1.17 1.74 0 50.51 
Net excess deposit 1763 1.40 4.13 -6.24 93.00 
Deposit interest rate 1899 4.42 1.40 0.33 11.94 
Capital adequacy ratio 1907 13.00 21.02 -187.20 490.15 
Return on assets 1907 -0.40 4.77 -65.19 25.53 
Collateral loan ratio 1906 0.79 0.17 0.12 1.00 
NPL ratio 1691 0.15 0.13 0 0.91 
Cost-assets ratio 1907 0.013 0 0 0.12 
Liquidity ratio 1905 1.58 1.23 0.08 29.34 
Total assets (ln) 1907 12.79 1.05 8.29 15.56 
Savings rate 1907 34.21 1.04 32.30 35.90 
Stock market index 
fluctuation 
1907 6.37 20.75 -40.70 49.7 
Inflation rate 1907 2.46 1.26 0.60 4.80 
 
Table 7. Correlation Between Variables 
 UNI DEP BIS ROA COL NPL LOQ COA ASSET RATE SAVING KOSPI INF 
UNI 1              
DEP 0.9346 1             
BIS 0.1182 0.1162 1            
ROA 0.2148 0.1822 0.3067 1           
COL -0.0271 -0.0214 0.0861 0.0631 1          
NPL -0.2255 -0.188 -0.1983 -0.5787 -0.1264 1         
LIQ -0.0467 -0.0491 0.1692 -0.0151 -0.293 0.0724 1        
COA 0.0059 0.0215 0.2935 0.0331 -0.0656 0.0652 0.2065 1      
ASSET 0.0552 0.0426 -0.2504 -0.0201 -0.1446 -0.0963 -0.2083 -0.0721 1     
RATE -0.1307 -0.1191 -0.2339 -0.1262 -0.0026 -0.0359 -0.2649 -0.037 0.1552 1    
SAVING -0.0145 -0.0038 0.0936 0.0468 -0.0049 0.0189 0.1601 0.004 -0.0076 -0.6772 1   
KOSPI 0.0134 0.002 -0.0292 -0.0266 0.0273 -0.0075 -0.0269 -0.09 0.0497 -0.1675 0.0102 1  
INF -0.1429 -0.1109 -0.1257 -0.0823 0.014 -0.0911 -0.1669 -0.0342 0.0358 0.7788 -0.484 -0.1637 1 
 
The results of estimation for the entire period for mutual savings banks are summarized in <Table 8>. If we 
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examine the uninsured excess deposits, which are generally expected to have depositor discipline functioning, they were 
shown to be statistically meaningful to collateral loan ratio and NPL ratio, which represent asset soundness, as well as 
costs-assets ratio, return on assets, and deposit interest rate. However, unlike general expectations, it was analyzed that 
collateral loan ratio and deposit interest rates have a negative correlation. Especially in the case of collateral loan ratio, 
unlike the collateral loans of commercial banks, the collateral loans of mutual savings banks are relatively high in 
moveable assets and subordinated debt so that it is difficult to properly evaluate the value of the collateral (note 7). 
Regarding deposits, that coefficient is not large so that even through it is meaningful in the 1% level; it was interpreted to 
not have a large impact on the behavior of depositors. Meanwhile, the BIS capital adequacy ratio, which represents asset 
soundness, was shown to be meaningful at the 10% level. Combining these, it was analyzed that the depositor discipline of 
mutual savings banks through uninsured excess deposits were somewhat functioning. What is interesting about mutual 
savings banks is that the costs-assets ratio was shown to be statistically meaningful for all dependent variables. This can be 
interpreted as the excessive sales activities of mutual savings banks ultimately lead to weakening profits and large 
depositors consider excessive cost expenditures to be the deterioration in the soundness of the savings banks leading them 
to decrease the size of their deposits. 
Next in the analysis using net excess deposits as the dependent variable, the same depositor discipline as the 
deposits exceeding the coverage limit was shown to be functioning, allowing us to reach the conclusion that uninsured 
depositors change their behavior based on whether the mutual savings bank is risk seeking or not. This is because the 
deposits mainly consist of time deposits and the ratio of demand deposits is not large so that generally it is considered a 
way to manage excess cash, so it can be interpreted that the depositor pays even more attention to its safety. 
Meanwhile, regarding deposit interest rates, most of the variables showed results of being statistically meaningful so 
that we can clearly see that the interest rate levels of mutual savings banks are determined related to the riskiness of the 
mutual savings bank. That is, that indicators of soundness, such as capital adequacy ratio and NPL ratio, have a negative (-) 
correlation with deposit interest rates show that the more sound the savings bank is the lower the deposit interest rate they 
are paying. In addition, the higher the return on assets and the costs-assets ratio, the more they acted as factors to decrease 
deposit interest rates. That is this can be interpreted as savings banks with high profits more easily attract deposits and 
therefore have a lower interest rate. However, regarding asset size and cost-assets ratio, it was shown to be meaningful 
which shows that deposit interest rates are relative impacted by size and employee effort. Next, the stock index and savings 
ratio were shown to decrease covered limit excess deposits, and this can be interpreted as when the profitability of 
alternative assets increase the deposits of savings banks decrease. Related to inflation, it caused an increase in nominal 
interest rates related to deposit interest rates, but could be seen to have a negative effect on deposit amounts due to 
increases in consumption amounts. Ultimately, the results of estimation on all the mutual savings banks showed that the 
depositor discipline was functioning properly, and it is conjectured that interest rate levels are greatly affected by the 
riskiness of mutual savings banks. Last of all, to examine whether the characteristics of depositors differ by region, we 
added the regional dummy dividing the Seoul and Gyeonggi regions as the metropolitan area and other regions, but it was 
shown to not be statistically meaningful. This indicated that there was no information gap between regions. 
 
Table 8. Estimated Results (Entire Period) 
Independent Variable Excess deposits  Net excess deposits Deposit interest rate 
Constant term 
3.5326*** 
(0.5912)  
4.1184*** 
(0.7852) 
19.2497*** 
(0.7370) 
Capital adequacy ratio (BIS) 
0.0015* 
 (0.0009) 
0.0018 
 (0.0011) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0014) 
Return on assets (ROA) 
0.0086** 
(0.0040) 
0.0095** 
 (0.0052) 
-0.0089* 
(0.0052) 
Collateral loan ratio (COL) 
-0.2613*** 
 (0.0772) 
-0.2942*** 
 (0.0999) 
0.1048 
(0.1419) 
NPL ratio (NPL) 
-0.8227*** 
 (0.1273) 
-0.8543*** 
 (0.1672) 
-0.3168* 
(0.1912) 
Cost-assets ratio (COST) 
-5.8555*** 
(1.6279) 
-8.3422*** 
 (2.1511) 
-12.2084*** 
(2.4150) 
Liquidity ratio (LIQ) 
0.0050  
(0.0135) 
0.0162  
(0.0178) 
0.0203 
(0.0198) 
Total assets (ln ASSET) 
0.0184 
 (0.0155) 
0.0175 
 (0.0198) 
0.1626*** 
(0.0330) 
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Deposit interest rate (RATE) 
-0.0703*** 
 (0.0167) 
-0.1024*** 
 (0.0222) 
 
 Savings rate (SAVING) 
-0.0885*** 
 (0.0154) 
-0.1017*** 
(0.0206)  
-0.5316*** 
(0.0174) 
Stock market index fluctuation 
(KOSPI) 
-0.0008 
 (0.0006) 
-0.0013 
 (0.0008) 
-0.0066*** 
(0.0008) 
Inflation rate (INF) 
-0.0366** 
(0.0144) 
-0.0197 
 (0.0192) 
0.5813*** 
(0.0147) 
Regional dummy (dummy) 
0.0343  
(0.0297) 
0.0491 
 (0.0377) 
0.0013 
(0.0712) 
Adjusted R2 0.1156  0.0870    0.7599  
Note: The superscript ***, **, * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively 
 
Next, we divided the analysis periods of the savings banks into 2007–2010 before the restructuring went into full 
swing, 2011–2014 when restructuring was underway, and 2015–2016 after the restructuring was completed, to see if the 
depositor discipline appeared differently in each period.  
First, in the 2007 to 2010 period before insolvency was taking place, the collateral loan ratio, costs-assets ratio, and 
the liquidity ratio all were shown to be meaningfully related to deposits exceeding the coverage limit and the net excess 
deposits. This is similar to the analysis results for the entire period. Furthermore, we can see that in the 2011 to 2014 period 
when insolvency was taking place in addition to the variables above, deposit amounts were shown to be meaningfully 
impacted by variables related to asset soundness, such as capital adequacy ratio and the NPL ratio. That is, capital 
adequacy ratio is a factor that increases deposits exceeding the coverage limit, and as the NPL ratio represents the size of 
non-performing loans, it acts as a factor that decreases deposits exceeding the coverage limit.  
Lastly, during the 2015 to 2016 period when the insolvency of mutual savings banks was being completed, 
acquisitions by other financial companies, such as banks, continued leading to large improvements in soundness, so that 
indicators that represent soundness were shown to be not meaningful to deposits exceeding the coverage limit. The 
characteristic of this period, as explained above, is that as savings banks were acquired by financial companies such as 
banks, their asset size increased so that unlike in the past, their asset size become considered an indicator for the 
profitability and soundness of savings banks. Thus, it was analyzed that the larger the asset size grew, the more deposits 
exceeding the coverage limit increased. Regarding deposits exceeding the coverage limit and net excess deposits, there was 
no clear difference between the two dependent variables, so that it could be seen that depositors did not differentiate 
deposits exceeding the coverage limit and net excess deposits but rather perceived the entire deposit amount as a single 
variable.  
 
Table 9. Estimated Results (Period Before Insolvency: the first half of 2007–the second half of 2010) 
Independent Variable Excess deposits  Net excess deposits Deposit interest rate 
Constant term 
2.6131*** 
 (0.4701) 
3.9160*** 
 (0.6766) 
13.2763*** 
(0.8837) 
Capital adequacy ratio (BIS) 
-0.0002 
 (0.0012) 
-0.0005 
 (0.0017)  
-0.0187*** 
(0.00287) 
Return on assets (ROA) 
0.0009 
 (0.0041) 
-0.0014 
 (0.0059) 
0.0218*** 
(0.00768) 
Collateral loan ratio (COL) 
-0.1883** 
 (0.0864) 
-0.2362* 
 (0.1250) 
0.1065 
(0.2217) 
NPL ratio (NPL) 
-0.1685 
 (0.1408) 
-0.3845* 
 (0.2051) 
0.0299 
(0.3362) 
Cost-assets ratio (COST) 
-5.4764** 
 (2.2885) 
-9.4956*** 
 (3.2929) 
-1.2939 
(5.1211) 
Liquidity ratio (LIQ) 
0.0877*** 
 (0.0118) 
0.1013*** 
 (0.0170) 
0.0115 
(0.0265) 
Total assets (ln ASSET) 
0.0104 
 (0.0142) 
-0.0028 
 (0.0204) 
0.0976** 
(0.0384) 
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Deposit interest rate (RATE) 
-0.0638*** 
 (0.0181) 
-0.1079*** 
 (0.0261) 
 
 Savings rate (SAVING) 
-0.0704*** 
 (0.0114) 
-0.0946*** 
(0.0164) 
-0.2753*** 
(0.0212) 
Stock market index fluctuation 
(KOSPI) 
0.0021*** 
 (0.0006) 
0.0013 
 (0.0008) 
-0.0156*** 
(0.0011) 
Inflation rate (INF) 
0.0283* 
 (0.0152) 
0.0260 
 (0.0219) 
0.1240*** 
(0.0325) 
Regional dummy (dummy) 
0.0235 
 (0.0274) 
0.0292 
 (0.0394) 
0.2030*** 
(0.0753) 
Adjusted R2  0.1822    0.1399  0.5936 
Note: The superscripts ***, **, * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 10. Estimated Results (Period of Insolvency: the first half of 2011–the second half of 2014) 
Independent Variable Excess deposits  Net excess deposits Deposit interest rate 
Constant term 
5.4660** 
 (2.6784) 
4.5936 
 (3.5145) 
16.9588*** 
(2.2028) 
Capital adequacy ratio (BIS) 
0.0040** 
 (0.0016)  
0.0051** 
 (0.0021) 
-0.0056*** 
(0.0013) 
Return on assets (ROA) 
0.0059 
 (0.0063) 
0.0092 
 (0.0083) 
-0.0052 
(0.0046) 
Collateral loan ratio (COL) 
-0.2888** 
 (0.1280) 
-0.3198* 
 (0.1680) 
-0.1481 
(0.1091) 
NPL ratio (NPL) 
-0.5357*** 
 (0.2035) 
-0.4475* 
 (0.2679) 
0.0661 
(0.1638) 
Cost-assets ratio (COST) 
-6.7419** 
 (2.9783) 
-9.3323** 
 (3.9084) 
-7.9854*** 
(2.5122) 
Liquidity ratio (LIQ) 
-0.0427 
 (0.0261) 
-0.0294 
 (0.0342) 
0.0590*** 
(0.0217) 
Total assets (ln ASSET) 
-0.0195  
(0.0292) 
-0.0254 
 (0.0383) 
0.1084*** 
(0.0246) 
Deposit interest rate (RATE) 
-0.1955*** 
 (0.0442) 
-0.2127*** 
 (0.0580) 
 
 Savings rate (SAVING) 
-0.1218  
(0.0769) 
-0.0935 
 (0.1010) 
-0.4408*** 
(0.0639) 
Stock market index 
fluctuation (KOSPI) 
-0.0097*** 
 (0.0032) 
-0.0101** 
 (0.0042) 
-0.0227*** 
(0.0026) 
Inflation rate (INF) 
-0.0039 
 (0.0295) 
0.0140 
 (0.0387) 
0.5058*** 
(0.0164) 
Regional dummy 
(dummy) 
0.1269** 
 (0.0528) 
0.1457** 
 (0.0692) 
-0.0286 
(0.0456) 
Adjusted R2 0.1700  0.1205   0.6363 
Note: The superscripts ***, **, * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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Table 11. Estimated Results (Period After Insolvency: the first half of 2015–the second half of 2016) 
Independent Variable Excess deposits  Net excess deposits Deposit interest rate 
Constant term 
3.6735 
 (2.4417) 
4.9066 
 (3.7650) 
6.8279*** 
(0.6814) 
Capital adequacy ratio (BIS) 
-0.0024 
 (0.0015)  
-0.0026 
 (0.0022) 
-0.0005 
(0.0007) 
Return on assets (ROA) 
0.0050 
 (0.0147) 
0.0140 
 (0.0221) 
-0.0019 
(0.0055) 
Collateral loan ratio (COL) 
-0.1999 
 (0.1613) 
-0.2662 
 (0.2288) 
-0.0911 
(0.0848) 
NPL ratio (NPL) 
-0.7847* 
 (0.4045) 
-1.1555* 
 (0.5842) 
0.3165* 
(0.1626) 
Cost-assets ratio (COST) 
-2.0203 
 (2.6102) 
-2.7836 
 (3.9377) 
5.2934*** 
(0.8169) 
Liquidity ratio (LIQ) 
0.0898** 
 (0.0380) 
0.0961* 
 (0.0565) 
0.01239 
(0.0129) 
Total assets (ln ASSET) 
0.1216*** 
 (0.0372) 
0.1339*** 
 (0.0514) 
0.0851*** 
(0.0214) 
Deposit interest rate (RATE) 
-0.1753 
 (0.1430) 
-0.2716 
 (0.2084) 
 
 Savings rate (SAVING) 
-0.1266* 
 (0.0648) 
-0.1580 
 (0.1002) 
-0.1466*** 
(0.0181) 
Stock market index fluctuation (KOSPI) 
-0.0026 
 (0.0066) 
-0.0050 
 (0.0105) 
0.0109*** 
(0.0017) 
Inflation rate (INF) 
0.0538 
 (0.0932) 
0.0708 
 (0.1399) 
-0.3988*** 
(0.0239) 
Regional dummy (dummy) 
-0.0500 
 (0.0678) 
-0.0145 
 (0.0940) 
-0.0579 
(0.0424) 
Adjusted R2  0.1195   0.0939  0.5235  
Note: The superscripts ***, **, * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
 
6. Conclusion and Implications 
This paper verified whether coverage limit-exceeding depositors withdraw or decrease their deposits based on the 
risk-seeking behavior of mutual savings banks and whether mutual savings banks in management crises present a relatively 
high-risk premium to attract deposits in order to verify the existence of depositor discipline for mutual savings banks. A 
summary of the major analysis results are as follows. 
For mutual savings banks, it was generally shown that depositor discipline was functioning properly. This is 
contrary to the perception that depositor discipline will not function as most of the deposits in mutual savings banks are 
included as targets for protection by the deposit insurance system. Next, the results of a verification of regional 
characteristics showed that there were no regional differences in depositor discipline. This seems to be because the 
information and communication technology in Korea is so developed that there is no information gap between urban and 
rural areas. Lastly, we divided the analysis period for mutual savings banks into the periods 2007 to 2010 before 
insolvencies were visible, 2011 to 2014 when restructuring was taking place, and 2015 to 2016 after the completion of the 
restructuring. The results were that asset soundness had a tendency to be given more importance when restructuring was 
ongoing, and after restructuring was complete, it was shown that improvements in asset soundness led to asset size having 
a positive effect on the size of deposits that exceed the coverage limit. Despite these analysis results, this paper still has 
some issues to face, which we would like to identify in the following. 
First is the fact that information asymmetry for mutual savings banks are severe so that it is difficult for depositors 
to properly judge the management status of mutual savings banks. As can be seen from past cases when mutual savings 
banks’ businesses were suspended, there was a large difference in the information disclosed by the mutual savings banks 
and the actual status of the mutual savings banks. Therefore, to allow depositor discipline to function, information about 
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mutual savings banks must be disclosed more transparently to ordinary depositors. 
Next is the problem regarding the ways to have market discipline function under the current deposit protection 
system for mutual savings banks where the majority consists of small depositors. In a situation where regulatory discipline 
is not functioning properly due to regulatory forbearance by the supervisory authorities, the reality is that the coverage limit 
is relatively excessive, making it harder for depositor discipline to function compared to when the coverage limit is low. In 
this case, as in the insolvencies of savings banks in the past, if the monitoring by the supervisory organizations is lacking 
and if not even the depositor discipline is functioning properly, this could lead to uncertainty in the financial system as a 
whole. Therefore, it is necessary to reevaluate the current deposit insurance system as a whole, to lower coverage limits to 
make depositor discipline function properly in order to suppress the risk-seeking behavior by mutual savings banks, and 
therefore suppress financial system uncertainty.  
Lastly in order to avoid the actual lowering of the deposit insurance coverage if the economy grows, we must 
consider raising the deposit insurance coverage. And also, it is necessary to increase the coverage during financial crisis so 
that depositors are not disturbed, but it remains a future research. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Excess deposits of 50 million refer to deposits that are eligible for deposit protection but exceed the 
protection limit, and net excess deposits refer to deposit amounts that the depositor can directly lose in the 
case that the financial institution becomes insolvent, which excludes the protection limit amount of 50 million 
won. 
Note 2.  This is the case in which the interest of the shareholders and managers take priority over the interest of 
depositors under the premise that the supervisory authorities decide whether to intervene based on the impact 
on social welfare. 
Note 3. Therefore, it is explained that a relation-dependent control structure, where shareholders control the 
financial institution when performance is satisfactory, and creditors control it when performance deteriorates, 
is advisable. 
Note 4. According to Demirguc- Kunt et al. (2014) 74 of the 101 countries (73.3%) have adopted limited 
coverage deposit insurance system. 
Note 5. The owners of uninsured deposits only receive protection for deposit amounts within the coverage limit 
and only receive a portion similar to general creditors for deposit amounts exceeding the limit. 
Note 6. The BIS capital adequacy ratio of mutual savings banks before 2005 was announced in half year 
intervals, therefore for dates before this, it was assumed that the capital adequacy ratio did not change during 
the half-year. 
Note 7. A large portion of collateral exists as collateral on objects such as cars, so there is the dimension that it is 
difficult to accurately evaluate value for these. 
 
